


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MSC SHIPPING

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D.P. Hawley", with a horizontal line underneath.

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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to examine when and why the Military Sealift Command (MSC) exercises operational and administrative command over MSC controlled shipping. MSC controlled vessels are considered to be all vessels currently administrated by MSC regardless of ownership or present command relationship. It should be recognized that MSC is involved with a large number and variety of ships, which are utilized by various organizations in support of worldwide operations. In addition MSC is continually expanding and taking on new roles and missions, which tend to require modifications in operational structures. Past experience in an exercise has indicted some difficulty and misunderstanding as to who had operational control and at what point control should shift when MSC ships were sailed from one area to another.¹ The diversity of MSC shipping, missions, and customers can at times result in confuse with regard to who has command and control for the operations of a ship. While MSC operates within the standard command channels, the wide range of operations and often temporary assignments of vessels coupled with an involvement of several organizations can potentially lead to a break down in unity of command. The most common problem with command and control of MSC ships is not that a chain of command does not exist, but that the personnel involved do not fully understand the chain of command.

This paper is written in an attempt to be understandable to anyone involved with MSC controlled ships regardless of background or service. Depending on the origin various MSC specific terms, policies, and practices may be inconsistent or not clearly delineated in any single source. In some cases standard practices may differ between MSC commands. Where there are

differences or no clear delineation for a particular aspect of operations the most common practice or what would transpire during a war time scenario is used.

For the purposes of this paper these terms will be used as follows: Operational Control (OPCON) is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and is transferable; Administrative Control (ADCON) is authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support; Tactical Control (TACON) is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.² All other critical terms not contained within the body of the paper are listed in appendix A. Where specific numbers of ships are stated, these assets are as of 01 October 1995.

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
A. INTRODUCTION

The history of MSC began on August 2, 1949 with the formation of the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). MSTS was formed from four separate government agencies involved in sea transportation and operation of ships. The majority of the MSTS ships came from the 115 ships of the Army Transport Service, and the 92 ships of the Naval Transportation Service. Early MSTS operations were primarily strategic sealift supporting military operations with troop transports, cargo ships, and tankers. In 1958 MSTS was assigned its first special mission ships with vessels conducting oceanographic research. In 1970 MSTS was renamed with its current title Military Sealift Command. In 1972 MSC became involved in underway replenishment of Navy combatant ships and formed its Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force. By 1982 MSC controlled ships were first used as prepositioned ships in the Indian Ocean. In 1987 a new unified command, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was established and assigned combatant command of MSC, Military Air Mobility Command, and Military Traffic Management Command.

Internally MSC maintains its headquarters in Washington, D.C. and has area commands for the Eastern Atlantic, Western Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East. There are also subarea commands, offices, and MSC representatives throughout the world. In addition the three preposition squadrons have MSC embarked squadron Commodores. The MSC chain of command includes both military and civilian personnel and while the military personnel are generally in the Navy some MSC representatives are from other services. MSC exercises its internal command and control functions through this chain of command (Fig. 1). Currently MSC is involved in restructuring in an attempt to streamline its internal command and control structure in the near

future. For the purposes of this paper MSC will be considered to be a single command and internal subordinate functions of MSC will not be broken down except where specifically noted.

Figure 1
MSC INTERNAL ORGANIZATION



MSC is under the department of the Navy, but for a variety of reasons inherent to its structure and operating regulations, MSC methods of operation are in many ways different from other activities within the Navy. MSC provides shipping for not only the Navy and Marine forces but also for the Army, Air force, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and several other government agencies. MSC operations, with the exception of MSC headquarters, are financed and funded through the Department of Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF).

DBOF activities do not depend on congressional appropriations, and they operate similarly to a commercial business by charging services to Department of Defense (DOD) users termed sponsors. The primary operating difference of a commercial enterprise and an agency under the DBOF, is that government agencies are not operated to make a profit. MSC operations involve employees of the military, DOD civilians, and contracted civilian personnel with employees both ashore and afloat. MSC is subject to a variety of regulatory bodies including the Navy, Office of Personnel Management, Coast Guard, American Bureau of Shipping, Public Health Service, and labor unions. As the exclusive authority within DOD to procure ocean transportation MSC must utilize many commercial shipping assets to provide much of its capability, especially in time of war.³ The major reason ships are operated under MSC vice active duty Navy is due to lower operating costs. The savings for a Naval vessel converted to MSC operations are \$4 to \$15 million annually, depending on the type of ship.⁴ While the mission of a MSC ship and a similar active duty Navy ship may be the same, the differences in operating procedures are vastly different for the above reasons.


B. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

In order to understand the command and control of MSC ships it should be considered that MSC, as with most other naval activities, is both an operational and an administrative commander. As an administrative commander MSC retains permanent ADCON over all MSC controlled ships; however, many ships under MSC control are not owned by the Navy. Thus, many administrative or logistic functions may actually be conducted under a contractual agreement with a commercial shipping company or other government agency. As an operational commander MSC has initial OPCON over all of the MSC controlled fleet. The operational chain of command is tasked

oriented and specific unit assignments in the operational chain are not permanent.⁵ Due to the transferable nature of OPCON, and the various missions MSC ships are involved in; the OPCON of a MSC vessel is often with a command other than MSC. Depending on the mission of a vessel, its OPCON may rest normally under MSC or under a numbered fleet commander via a fleet Commander in Chief (CINC) or directly under the CINC.

MSC has three major command relationships or chains of command. The first is MSC as the Navy's Executive Agent for Sealift or head contracting activity (fig.2). This is an administrative chain of command within the Navy and assigns MSC responsibility for all Navy Strategic Sealift matters such as procurement of merchant ships.


Figure 2
MSC AS NAVY EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SEALIFT



The second chain of command is an operational chain with MSC performing an administrative function as the Type Commander for Sealift, (fig. 3) under this chain of command MSC functions similar to any other type commander in providing forces to a CINC for operational control. Vessels under this chain of command fall under Title 10 of the United States code as service-unique or theater-assigned shipping. Title 10 withholds assignment of these vessels from the

Combatant Command (COCOM) of USTRANSCOM and allows them to be assigned to a numbered fleet commander via the fleet CINC or directly to the CINC.


Figure 3
MSC AS TYPE COMMANDER FOR SEALIFT



The third chain of command is also an operational chain of command with MSC as the Component Commander for Strategic Sealift under TRANSCOM (fig. 4) vessels under this chain of command are generally referred to as common-user sealift. Common-user sealift vessels are a pool of transportation assets that are available for use by all branches of the service or DOD. Some vessels in this pool may be configured for specific missions and would be initially reserved for a designated mission. All MSC controlled vessels will fall under the OPCON of a numbered

fleet commander via the fleet CINC or under the OPCON of MSC via TRANSCOM.

Figure 4
MSC AS COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR SEALIFT



C. MSC FLEET

The MSC controlled fleet comprises approximately 129 active ships, but this number changes monthly depending on requirements. MSC controlled ships are those owned and operated by MSC (nucleus fleet), contract operated, chartered, or ships maintained by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and assigned to MSC after activation. This fleet is broken down into three forces that perform different missions and fall under different command and control structures. These forces consist of the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), Special Mission Support Force, and the Strategic Sealift Force. A fourth force is sometimes included and termed the Miscellaneous Service Support Force, which consists of chartered vessels used for specialized

DOD projects, for the purposed of this paper this force will not be considered as its operation would be similar to vessels falling under the other forces. MSC has ADCON over all of the vessels within these forces, but the crew, operators, and ownership vary greatly, and in most cases there are only generalities and no actual regulations that apply to each force. In order to fully understand the command and control of the MSC controlled fleet a basic understanding of these forces is needed.

1. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force

The NFAF ships are the most visible MSC ships to the active duty navy. This force consists of approximately 30 vessels providing services in direct support of Navy combatant ships, and it consists mainly of Underway Replenishment ships (UNREP), ocean towing vessels, and ocean surveillance ships. These vessels are mostly owned by the Navy and generally crewed by federal government employees of MSC. NFAF vessels fall under United States code title 10 as service-unique transportation assets. As service-unique these vessels are withheld from assignment to TRANSCOM and are operated under the department of Navy by MSC. These vessels fall under the MSC type commander chain of command and when deployed are operated similar to other active duty surface vessels with OPCON under a numbered fleet commander.

2. Special Mission Support Force

The Special Mission Support Force is the smallest force within MSC and is involved in carrying out various specialized missions for the government. These missions include surveying, oceanographic research, ocean cable operations, surveillance, missile tracking, and other specialized missions. As with NFAF vessels these ships are assigned to the Department of Navy as service-unique transportation ships and are not TRANSCOM assets. These ships are normally

owned by the Navy and crewed and operated by either MSC or a commercial contractor. Often included aboard these vessels are a variety of civilian scientists and technicians involved in the special mission areas. As with the NFAF these vessels fall under the MSC type commander chain of command and would normally be under the OPCON of a numbered fleet commander via the fleet CINC. Due to the highly specialized and distinct missions these ships perform, the OPCON may remain with MSC for certain missions. MSC retaining OPCON of a special mission vessel is generally for convenience, when a fleet commander does not have an organization in place familiar with the mission of a particular vessel. Regardless of the OPCON of certain special mission vessels their tasking is sometimes from commands or agencies outside of the operational chain of command. This often results in the operational commander having OPCON in name only and not actual control of the vessel. This situation is often the result of a numbered fleet commander having OPCON and another agency outside of the Navy being the sponsor organization for the vessel, and without a deliberate effort for interagency cooperation there will be a conflict of interests and a break down in the unity of command.

3. Strategic Sealift Force

The third and largest force is the Strategic Sealift Force. This force consists of active and inactive or reserve ships and would be the force most visible to Army and Marine Corps personnel. These vessels are a mix of service-unique or theater-assigned vessels and common-user sealift under TRANSCOM. The Strategic sealift force has various types of ships to support operational contingencies and consists of the Afloat Propositioning Force (PREPO / APF), Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), hospital ships (T-AH), aviation logistics support ships (T-AVB), Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships, and chartered commercial vessels. The RRF ships are generally

regarded to be only those vessels of the National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF) capable of being utilized within a 20-day readiness status. The RRF consists of approximately 93 ships of which seven are currently activated for the PREPO force, with the rest on a 5 to 20 day readiness status. The remainder of the NDRF ships are generally not considered to be usable in the short term, but if activated would fall under the same operational control as the RRF.

The RRF ships are a variety of tanker, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO), breakbulk, and other vessels owned by the government. The RRF ships are generally deemed to be common-user sealift. These ships are government owned but crewed and operated by commercial companies, with the exception of two hospital ships which are Navy owned and MSC crewed and operated. The RRF ships are under the OPCON of MSC once activated. When inactive these ships are maintained by the Maritime Administration (MARAD). MARAD is under the Department of Transportation and its functions are cooperative but separate from MSC. Some ships in the RRF are specially configured including 11 ships outfitted with underway replenishment capabilities, these vessels are termed Combat Logistic Force (CLF) hold backs and could be used to augment the CLF underway replenishment vessels under the OPCON of a numbered fleet commander, when not used for this purpose they would be common user sealift. All common-user sealift of the RRF would fall under the OPCON of MSC as the component commander for strategic sealift.

The Fast Sealift Ships were former container ships belonging to the U.S. commercial shipping company Sea Land and are often referred to by their former company class name SL-7. These eight vessels are the fastest cargo ships in the world and are modified to carry bulky military equipment and vehicles. The ships are owned by the Navy and crewed and operated under contract with a commercial company to be available on a 3-day notice. Currently 3 of 8 FSS are

active and participating in exercises. The FSS fall under the OPCON of MSC as the component commander for strategic sealift.

PREPO vessels consist of 13 Maritime Propositioning Ships (MPS) configured to support and supply the Marine Corps, and the 21 Afloat Propositioning Force (APF) vessels with equipment to support Army and Air Force combat elements. The APF vessels are a mixture of tankers, Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH), freighters, RO/RO, float on/float off (FLO/FLO), crane ships, and container ships. Currently under construction or conversion are six Large Medium Speed Roll on/Roll off (LMSR) vessels. Of the current 21 APF vessels 10 are MARAD owned ships activated from the RRF, and one is a Navy owned and MSC operated former replenishment ship. The other APF and MPS vessels are under contract and owned and operated by commercial companies.

Chartered commercial ships can be used under various capacities within the strategic sealift force, and they can be U.S. or foreign flagged vessels. Except for those chartered vessels used as PREPO ships most chartered vessels are under the OPCON of MSC as the component commander for strategic sealift, and they are used to transport DOD petroleum products to various ports. One notable exception is two tankers with underway replenishment capabilities that have fallen under the OPCON of a numbered fleet commander in the past.

Under the strategic sealift force there exists some specially configured ships that are operated under Reduced Operating Status (ROS) and are not initially part of the common user sealift pool. ROS ships are manned and maintained by a skeleton crew and capable of getting underway on relatively short notice. The readiness of a ROS ship rests between active and inactive ships, and they are placed in this status to not only provide high value assets on short notice but also to

provide a cost savings to the sponsor relative to fully operational ships. ROS is not limited to the strategic sealift force and NFAF, special mission, and other ships are placed in this status at times, with the sponsor being charged a lower per diem rate. The two Navy owned and MSC operated hospital ships (T-AH) are in ROS status. The hospital ships are also considered to be part of the PREPO group of ships, although they are berthed in the U.S. and not attached to one of the PREPO squadrons. Two RRF Aviation Support ships (T-AVB) are also in ROS, these ships contain Marine aviation maintenance equipment and are owned by MARAD and contract operated. Under conversation are two Amphibious Cargo ships (T-LKA) which are to be placed in ROS. When fully operational T-AH, T-AVB, and T-LKA ships would be service-unique or theater-assigned assets under a numbered fleet commander; however, once off loaded the T-AVB and T-LKA ships would revert to common-user sealift status under the OPCON of MSC as the component commander for sealift. Ships in ROS should normally remain under the same OPCON as when they are fully operational.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

As an administrative commander MSC exercises functions that fall under other than the operational chain of command of the unified or specified commanders. This chain of command is permanent in nature and manages readiness, administration, and support of the forces in the command. Readiness consists of personnel, material, and training readiness. For MSC controlled ships the readiness functions generally fall under the purview of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which include the regulations of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) as regulatory bodies. In addition to the CFR some MSC vessels, especially NFAF and special mission, are required to comply with a variety of Navy and MSC regulations.

Under the requirements in the CFR personnel and training readiness regulations are generally handled synonymous with the issue of seamen documents and licenses which are renewed every five years. Material readiness and overhaul requirements are addressed by USCG inspections in conjunction with ABS certifications at specified time intervals. The requirement for a vessel to be materially inspected and certified under the USCG while under the OPCON of another federal agency such as the Navy can lead to conflicts and confusion in the operation of the vessels. The fact that a ship is under "contract" and OPCON of a fleet commander does not alleviate the requirements to conform with the regulations of the CFR. Thus it is incumbent on MSC to communicate its regulatory obligations, such as a required dry docking, to the sponsor organization for a ship. The sponsor organizations and OPCON authorities need to realize that these requirements are federally mandated and beyond the control of MSC.

In the event of a conflict between the operational and administrative interests of a vessel the CFR contains provisions for waivers of navigation and inspection laws to allow for such situations. CFR waiver provisions for MSC vessels apply to all U.S. vessels in the MSC controlled fleet regardless if owned or chartered by MSC. Under these provisions MSC as ADCON may apply for a waiver in writing to the USCG if it is necessary in the interest of national defense for the vessel to carry out an assigned mission. In the case of an extreme urgency the application for a waiver may be made orally and a waiver issued immediately. While MSC as ADCON has the sole authority for applying for a waiver, it is to the advantage of the command having OPCON or being supported, to understand that such a process exists. The operational or supported command should be able and willing to provide justification of how the mission of a vessel is the interest of national defense. If the supported command does not raise

the issue of keeping a vessel in service, MSC may not be aware that a conflict exists. An additional consideration is the significant monetary cost involved in canceling a scheduled repair period, and this may have to be factored into any decision or lead to an alternate solution.

E. OPERATIONAL CONTROL

When MSC acts as the type commander for sealift, OPCON is transferred for NFAF, Special Mission, and Preposition ships to the numbered fleet commander with MSC retaining ADCON and responsibility for repair, overhaul, and training of vessels assigned. As with other Naval type commanders during periods of major overhaul and training MSC will generally have OPCON as well as ADCON. Upon completion of an overhaul period MSC would transfer OPCON of the ship back to the numbered fleet commander. As a type commander MSC is assigned a task force number for execution of operational responsibilities, e.g., CTG 18.1/MSCPAC. When an MSCPAC vessel's OPCON is transferred from the numbered fleet commander to MSCPAC, it is actually transferred to CTG 18.1, Commander Sealift Group Pacific. While CTG 18.1 and COMSCPAC are one in the same command, for the purpose of clarifying the operational chain of command CTG 18.1 should be used.

With MSC as a component commander for strategic sealift under TRANSCOM, OPCON as well as ADCON is generally retained by MSC or more correctly CTG 18.1 in the case of MSCPAC. Regardless if MSC is acting as type commander or as a component commander the same administrative responsibilities for readiness are retained. However, as much of the strategic sealift force is not owned by the Navy many of the traditional administrative functions will be handled by commercial companies or other organizations. This results in MSC having responsibility but something less than direct control over many readiness issues for these ships.

This lack of direct administrative control over much of the strategic sealift force often delegates MSC to more of a role as a point of contact for these ships on some matters.

F. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Amphibious operations, or an off-load of a PREPO vessel in support of an operation, often present a special case in utilizing MSC ships and can cause confusion over the operational control of a ship. MPS and APF ships involved in an amphibious operation would be under the OPCON of a numbered fleet commander, and they would normally transfer OPCON to the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) at the same time as other naval vessels involved in the operation. RRF, FSS, or common-user sealift ships would initially be under the OPCON of MSC. OPCON for these MSC provided ships would shift to the CATF at the time of embarkation of landing force personnel, supplies, and equipment, unless otherwise stated in the initiating directive.⁶ Unless previous arrangements have been made, once a PREPO ship or other vessel in an amphibious operation discharges its cargo at the designated area it no longer is a service-unique or theater-assigned asset, and it now becomes common-user strategic sealift under MSC as a component commander of TRANSCOM. As with any shift in OPCON the CATF or command holding OPCON would first have to formally release the vessel.

The reasoning behind shifting OPCON of an APF or MPS ship without a dedicated cargo aboard is sound in that the ship can be made available for other users. However, if the CATF is not aware of the fact that the control of the vessels will shift, and the CATF does not plan for the complete off-load of the vessels or intends to utilize the ships for additional purposes there could be serious follow-on implications. TRANSCOM may have allocated a MPS ship as common-user sealift to be available on a specific date for services to the CATF or other users. An awareness at

all levels and proper coordination is needed to ensure that planning conflicts do not take place, and this can be best accomplished if the ship and MSC clearly communicate the follow-on requirements for shipping in the planning phase of an operation.

G. TACTICAL CONTROL

Related to OPCON is TACON, or local control. The concept of TACON of a ship is often misunderstood outside of the surface Navy, which can result in a great amount of confusion with regard to the command and control of a specific MSC ship. TACON should not be considered to be the equivalent of OPCON nor does TACON have any direct relationship to ADCON functions. For the purposes of MSC controlled ships TACON can best be thought of as the local control of a MSC ship that directs its day to day movements to provide for the safety and protection of the vessel while underway. TACON for MSC ships is transferable and can be held by a variety of afloat and ashore commands as required by the situation. OPCON and TACON may or may not be held by the same command.

For NFAF vessels deployed under the OPCON of a numbered fleet commander, TACON would not differ from any other naval surface unit in company. Special Mission ships generally operate alone most of the time and are responsible for their own local movements and TACON is not usually an issue. In the event tactical control is necessary for a special mission ship it would normally be exercised via a numbered fleet commander. For PREPO ships under the OPCON of a number fleet commander the TACON would normally rest with the embarked MSC Commodore (Navy O-6) for transit to an off-load site. In the case of a PREPO squadron transiting with a battle group TACON would generally be with the same command as the other Navy ships in company. Once the PREPO ship off loads and it reverts to common user sealift the

TACON would vary depending on the situation.

While the OPCON of common-user sealift remains with MSC the TACON changes depending on the situation. Initial TACON rests with MSC, when in the opinion of MSC a significant threat to the ships exists the vessels will be placed under the TACON of a Navy component commander of the geographic combatant commander.⁷ The component commander is then tasked with establishing and implementing a plan to provide for protection of the merchant vessels. In the event of war or a major conflict the Naval Control of Shipping Organization (NCSORG) may be in effect, and they would assume TACON of common-user sealift. NCSORG is a Navy organization which provides for the control and protection of merchant ships in time of war. While NCSORG would have TACON for the local movements of the ships or convoy, MSC as OPCON would still retain authority over normal operational control issues such as ports and arrival dates.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS and CONCLUSIONS

As with other commands involved in joint operations, MSC command and control often suffers from a misunderstanding of terminology or the differing use of common terminology which can lead to confusion in the area of operational control. It is beyond the purview of this paper to recommend changes to joint terminology, nor to propose that anything other than the terms used in the joint publications be used, but it would appear that some efforts are underway to clarify command and control terminology. Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, recommends the deletion of the terms: operational chain of command and administrative chain of command. In addition while ADCON is used under the DOD definition in joint publications there is no separate joint definition for ADCON and the phrase "logistic

authority” is used as an apparent equivalent term. TACON is also used under the DOD definition and does not have a specific joint definition. Much of the confusion in understanding command relationships is in comprehending what are the differences between the various levels of control or authority. The fact that the word “control” is a part of OPCODE, ADCON, and TACON often is the source of confusion. Replacing ADCON with the term “logistic authority” and a similar change in the term TACON could significantly reduce confusion with regard to understanding who has operational control of a vessel.

OPCODE of MSC controlled shipping is frequently transferred to a numbered fleet commander and back to MSC, and this results in a great deal of confusion for the ship and sponsor as to when MSC has responsibility for operational issues. In situations where the sponsor is not the Navy it can be especially confusing as MSC often acts in a liaison role between the ship and the operational commander, and it may not be clear to the ship or sponsor that MSC may not have OPCODE at the time. To clarify the issue of OPCODE for MSC controlled vessels the task group or task force numbers should be used rather than the plain language addresses for MSC when MSC is the operational commander. In some cases this may be the practice, but the use of task group numbers is not exercised universally throughout MSC. The use of task group numbers creates an additional problem as the numbers are often not recognized by many people and commands involved with the ships. In addition numbers can change as a vessel moves between areas of responsibility. To overcome the recognition problem of task group numbers a statement is needed in the correspondence to equate the number with the plain language address and explain that task group numbers are used when MSC has OPCODE.

The problems of understanding the command and control of a MSC ship are complicated by

the design and nature of the missions and assets involved. The nonstandard missions and involvement of agencies outside of the DOD will always result in ships that cannot be operated in the same manner as an active duty Navy vessel. The current MSC type commander and component commander relationships are the most viable options considering the situation. Instead of attempting to change the command relationships the solution is to ensure MSC ships are always operated within the confines of existing structures. In addition a greater understanding of the ships, and their operating requirements is needed by the users and associated commands. MSC needs to be better integrated into military operations without incurring additional expenses or increasing the number of personnel involved. There are situations where MSC may need to act as liaison between a ship and an operational commander, but for most operational matters the commands and ships should be capable and comfortable with dealing directly with each other.

The increased use of MSC controlled shipping has complicated the understanding of the command and control for some military operations to the extent that unity of command and effort can be effected. The problems and potential problems involved with MSC controlled shipping mirrors those of other joint operations. Unity of command requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders, up, down, and laterally.⁸ While various instructions may be cited to describe the delineations of responsibility, the fact that confusion exists indicates that the delineation is not clear. In order to clarify the command and control issues and provide for unity of command and effort of MSC controlled vessels, MSC should take the lead in developing cognizance on these issues. The diverse backgrounds of personnel involved with MSC ships can result in the sponsor of a ship, as well as the crew aboard the ship, not being familiar with the

command channels and relationships of the Navy or MSC, this is especially true in the case of contract operated MSC vessels. In almost all situations MSC will be supporting another command and regardless of which command has the responsibility of ensuring the command relationships for a particular vessel are clear, MSC is in the best position to clarify these issues.

NOTES

1. Naval Warfare Publication 22-8 (Rev. D Ch-2), MSC Support of Amphibious Operations (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington DC: 1993), 4-2.
2. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC: 1995), xiii.
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APPENDIX A GUIDE TO TERMINOLOGY

The following definitions are as per the "Approved DOD Terminology thru JMTGM 017-95", from the Joint Electronic library DC-ROM Volume 3, No. 1 of May 1995:

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL (ADCON)

Source: (DOD). Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Source: JP 0-2 None. Recommend the deletion of this term and definition.

*within this paper this phrase is used to mean a command relationship involving mainly administrative control.

COMBATANT COMMAND (COCOM)

Source: JP 5-0. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

COMBATANT COMMANDER

Source: JP 0-2. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CINC.

COMMON-USER LIFT

Source: JP 1-02 (DOD). US Transportation Command-controlled lift: The pool of strategic transportation assets either government owned or chartered that are under the operational control of Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, or Military Traffic Management Command for the purpose of providing common-user transportation to the Department of Defense across the range of military operations. These assets range from common-user organic or chartered pool of common-user assets available day-to-day to a larger pool of common-user assets phased in from other sources.

COMPONENT COMMAND, SERVICE

Source: JP 0-2. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations under the command including the support forces, that have been assigned to a combatant command, or

CONTROLLED SHIPPING

Source: JP 1-02 (DOD). Shipping that is controlled by the Military Sealift Command. Included in this category are Military Sealift Command ships (United States Naval Ships), government-owned ships operated under a general agency agreement, and commercial ships under charter to the Military Sealift Command. See also Military Sealift Command; United States Naval Ship.

EXECUTIVE AGENT

Source: (DOD). A term used in Department of Defense and service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes.

FORCE

Source: JP 1-02 (DOD). 2. A major subdivision of a fleet.

GROUP

Source: JP 1-02 (DOD). 2. A number of ships and/or aircraft, normally a subdivision of a force, assigned for a specific purpose.

NUMBERED FLEET

Source: JP 1-02 (DOD). A major tactical unit of the Navy immediately subordinate to a major fleet command and comprising various task forces, elements, groups, and units for the purpose of prosecuting specific naval operations.

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

Source: JP 0-2 None. Recommend the deletion of this term and definition.

* within this paper this phrase is used to mean a command relationship involving mainly operational control.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON)

Source: JP 0-2. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

TACTICAL CONTROL (TACON)

Source: (DOD). Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command.

TYPE COMMAND

Source: JP 1-02 (DOD). An administrative subdivision of a fleet or force into ships or units of the same type, as differentiated from a tactical subdivision. Any type command may have a flagship, tender, and aircraft assigned to it.